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Contents
This paper studies the adverse price effects of convergence trading. I assume two assets with identical cash flows trad-
ed in segmented markets. Initially, there is gap between the prices of the assets, because local traders’ face asymmet-
ric temporary shocks. In the absence of arbitrageurs, the gap remains constant until a random time when the difference
across local markets disappears. While arbitrageurs’ activity reduces the price gap, it also generates potential losses:
the price gap widens with positive probability at each time instant. With the increase of arbitrage capital on the market,
the predictability of the dynamics of the gap decreases, and the arbitrage opportunity turns into a risky speculative bet.
In a calibrated example we show that the endogenously created losses alone can explain episodes when arbitrageurs
lose most of their capital in a relatively short time.
JEL classification: G10, G20, D5.
Keywords: Convergence trading, Limits to arbitrage, Liquidity crisis.
Abstract
A tanulmány az arbitrázs stratégiák árhatását vizsgálja. Tegyük fel, hogy létezik két nagyon hasonló értékpapír két szeg-
mentált piacon, amelyek árai idõlegesen eltérnek, mert a helyi piaci szereplõk keresletét eltérõ sokkok érik. Ha az arbi-
trázsõrök nincsenek jelen a piacon, az árak eltérése konstans egy véletlen idõpontig, amikor is a különbség megszûnik.
Megmutatom, hogy az arbitrázsõrök stratégiája csökkenti az árkülönbség nagyságát, de ugyanakkor megteremti a
veszteségek lehetoségét is: az árkülönbség pozitív valószínûséggel növekszik tetszõleges ideig. Minél több az arbi-
trázsõrök tõkéje a piacon, annál kevésbé elõre jelezhetõ az árkülönbség dinamikája. Az arbitrázslehetõség egy egyszerû
spekulatív befektetéssé válik. Egy kalibrált példában megmutatom, hogy az endogén módon keletkezett veszteségek
elegendõek olyan epizódok létrejöttéhez, amikor az arbitrázsõrök rövid idõ alatt tõkéjük nagy részét elvesztik.
Összefoglalás
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It has been widely observed that prices of fundamentally very similar assets can differ significantly. Perhaps the best
known examples are the so-called “Siamese twin stocks” (e.g. Royal Dutch Petroleum/Shell Transport and Trade,
Unilever NV/Unilever PC, SmithKline Beckman/Beecham Group) which represent claims on virtually identical cash-
flows, yet their price differential fluctuates substantially around the theoretical parity.
1
Financial institutions speculat-
ing on the convergence of prices of similar assets (whom I will loosely refer to as “arbitrageurs”) can suffer large loss-
es if diverging prices force them to unwind some of their positions. The spectacular collapse of the Long-Term Capital
Management hedge fund in 1998 is frequently cited as an example of this phenomenon.
2
In this paper I argue that the
possibility of similar episodes is an equilibrium consequence of the competition of arbitrageurs with limited capital. In
contrast to previous models,
3
our mechanism is not a result of the amplification of exogenous adverse shocks. Instead,
it is based on an efficiency argument. Arbitrageurs’ competition generates the possibility of losses, because without
these the investment opportunity would be too attractive to exist in equilibrium. In a calibrated example I show that
these endogenously created losses alone can explain episodes when arbitrageurs lose most of their capital in a rel-
atively short time.
I present an analytically tractable, stochastic, general equilibrium model of convergence trading. I assume two assets
with identical cash flows traded in segmented markets. Initially, there is a gap between the prices of the assets
because local traders’ hedging needs differ. In each time instant the difference across local markets disappears with
positive probability. Therefore, in the absence of arbitrageurs, the gap remains constant until a random time when it
disappears. I label this interval with asymmetric local demand a window of arbitrage opportunity. Arbitrageurs can
profit from the temporary presence of the window by taking opposite positions in the two markets. Arbitrageurs have
limited capital. To take a position, they have to be able to collateralize their potential losses. If their trades did not
affect prices, the development of the gap would provide a one-sided bet as prices could only converge. However, by
trading, they endogenously determine the size of the gap as long as the window is open. At the same time, arbi-
trageurs have to decide how to allocate their capital over time given the uncertain characteristics of future arbitrage
opportunities, i.e., the development of the price gap.
4
Thus, there is interdependence between arbitrageurs’ optimal
strategies and the pattern of future arbitrage opportunities.
Our main result is that in the unique robust equilibrium, arbitrageurs’ individually optimal strategies generate losses
in the form of widening price gaps. Essentially, opportunities which are “too attractive” have to be eliminated in equi-
librium. In particular, in each time instant the expected gains and expected losses provided by the dynamics of the
gap have to be such that arbitrageurs are indifferent about when to invest that particular unit. Otherwise, no arbi-
trageur would choose the dominated times. If there were an interval when the gap does not widen when the window
remains open, investing in the starting point of this interval will dominate saving capital for later points. This is so
because the investment opportunity is not getting more profitable, and there is the additional risk that the window clos-
1. Introduction
1
See Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Froot and Dabora (1999) for details.
2
For detailed analysis of the LTCM crisis see e.g. Edwards (1999), Loewenstein (2000), MacKenzie (2003). Although after the collapse of the LTCM many
market participants made changes to their risk-management systems to avoid similar events, it is clear that financial markets are still prone to similar liq-
uidity crises. A very recent example is the turbulence in May 2005 connected to the price differential between General Motors stocks and bonds: “The
big worry is that an LTCM-style disaster is occurring with hedge funds as they unwind GM debt/stock trade (a potential Dollars 100bn trade across the
industry) at a loss, causing massive redemptions from convert arb funds, forcing them to unwind other trades, and so on, leading to a collapse of the debt
markets and then all financial markets.” (Financial Times, US Edition, May 23, 2005).
3
Apart from the seminal paper of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and the following literature on limits to arbitrage (e.g. Xiong, 2001, Kyle and Xiong, 2001,
Gromb and Vayanos, 2002), there is also a related literature which concentrates on endogenous risk as a result of amplification due to financial constraints
(e.g. Danielsson and Shin, 2002, Danielsson et al. 2002, 2004, Morris and Shin, 2004, Bernardo and Welch, 2004). Relatedly, Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2005) show that predatory trading of non-distressed traders can also amplify exogenous liquidity shocks.
4
Our focus on the timing of arbitrage trades connects our work to Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003). However, our problem is dramatically different.
They analyze a model where the development of the gap between a price of an asset and its fundamental value is exogenously given and informational
asymmetries cause a coordination problem in strategies over the optimal time to exit the market. In our model, information is symmetric, arbitrageurs are
competitive, they want to be on the market when others are not (i.e., there is strategic substitution instead of complementarities), and our focus is the
endogenous determination of the price gap. Furthermore, we do not model a bubble, but the endogenous development of a price gap, which cannot
increase above a certain level.
es during the interval. But if arbitrageurs do not save capital for later time points, the gap will widen.
5
Hence, the com-
petition of arbitrageurs transforms the price process in a fundamental way. Without arbitrageurs the price gap could
only converge. While arbitrageurs’ activity reduces the price gap, it also generates potential losses: the price gap
widens with positive probability in each time instant.
The robust equilibrium is selected from a large number of possible equilibria by a simple selection method. This is the
only equilibrium which is compatible with the presence of arbitrarily small holding cost like a shorting fee. I show that
the inclusion of a positive shorting fee always results in a unique equilibrium with very similar properties to the robust
equilibrium. Indeed, as the holding cost diminishes the unique equilibrium of a world with positive holding cost con-
verges to the unique robust equilibrium of a world where trading is free. It is one of the non-robust equilibria, where
the gap is fully eliminated in all periods.
I demonstrate with the help of a calibrated example that these losses created by the competition of arbitrageurs can
be quantitatively substantial. In particular, these endogenous losses alone are enough to cause arbitrageurs to lose
most of their capital in a relatively short time with positive probability.
The robust equilibrium illustrates how arbitrageurs’ competition transforms the arbitrage opportunity. The change of
the gap is highly predictable when arbitrageurs are not present on the market: prices can only converge, just the time
of the convergence is uncertain. When arbitrageurs enter the market, divergence of price will be possible and the pre-
dictability of the change of the gap decreases. The more active arbitrage-capital enters the market, the more similar
the dynamics of the gap gets to a martingale process of unpredictable gap changes. Thus, arbitrageurs’ competition
transforms the arbitrage opportunity into a standard speculative bet where the probability weighted gains exceed the
probability weighted losses less and less. This implies that the presence of price differentials between very similar
assets does not imply the lack of arbitrage activity. In the robust equilibrium, the gap is never fully eliminated and
occasionally can be substantial. The valid question to valuate the activity of arbitrageurs is to what extent the dynam-
ics of the price gap is predictable.
The analytical tractability of our model stems from the reduced state space in our structure. The state of the window
influences the distribution of the price gap in a trivial manner. If the window closes in a given period, then the price
gap jumps to zero in that period and our modelled world ends. It is thus sufficient to characterize the path of the price
gap conditional on an open window. This result in a one-dimensional system, where one state variable, time (or equiv-
alently the aggregate level of capital at that point in time) determines the equilibrium development of the price gap
and the aggregate portfolio of arbitrageurs.
Our model naturally belongs to the literature on general equilibrium analysis of risky arbitrage (e.g., Gromb and
Vayanos, 2002, Zigrand, 2004, Xiong, 2001, Kyle and Xiong, 2001, Basak and Croitoru, 2000). However, to the best
of my knowledge, this paper is the first to show that competition of arbitrageurs alone can generate losses. In con-
trast to previous models focusing on potential losses in convergence trading (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Xiong, 2001,
Gromb and Vayanos, 2003, Liu and Longstaff, 2004), my mechanism is not based on the amplification of exogenous
shocks by the capital constraint. Instead, it is based on an efficiency argument. The reason for my unique finding is
that this is the first attempt to analyze the price effect of arbitrageurs whose dynamic portfolio choice is influenced by
uncertain future arbitrage possibilities over a long time span. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gromb and Vayanos
(2002) touch upon one of the elements of our mechanism. Allowing uncertainty of future opportunities in one period
only, they show that arbitrageurs may be reluctant to take a maximal position as they fear that they will make losses
when the arbitrage possibility will be the most attractive. I show that allowing uncertainty over a longer time span, this
consideration is sufficient to transform the price process in a systematic way. In spirit, our paper is close to Liu and
Longstaff (2004) who argue that arbitrage with limited capital might lead to substantial losses. However, in their model,
this is a result of an exogenously defined price process, while my focus is on the determination of the price process.
The closest paper to my model in its stochastic structure is Xiong (2001) as he also considers arbitrage possibilities
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Interestingly, our argument is similar to the text-book mechanism of full elimination of price discrepancies by risk-neutral arbitrageurs with unlimited cap-
ital. There, price discrepancies providing positive expected profit would attract large investments and would be eliminated. In our case, price gaps which
cannot diverge would be similarly attractive possibilities and would be eliminated.
which are present for an uncertain time span. However, a crucial difference is that in his model, because of their spe-
cific preferences, the uncertainty over future arbitrage opportunities does not influence the decisions of arbitrageurs.
Furthermore, his results rely mostly on numerical results, while my equilibrium can be fully characterized analytically.
This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I present the structure of the model. In section 3, I derive the unique
robust equilibrium. In section 4, I discuss the results and in section 5, I analyze the robustness of my equilibrium.
Finally, I conclude.
INTRODUCTION
MNB WORKING PAPERS · 2006/6 7
The structure of the model is based on three groups of agents: two groups of local traders in two segmented markets
and a group of arbitrageurs taking positions on both markets. A temporary asymmetry in the demand curves of local
traders creates an arbitrage opportunity. As the asymmetry is bound to disappear sooner or later, so is the arbitrage
opportunity. As arbitrageurs can take positions on both markets, they can exploit the price discrepancy. They are in the
focus of my analysis. They have limited capital so they have to decide how to allocate it over time given the distribution
of future arbitrage opportunities. Their strategies in turn determine the development of the price gap through market
clearing. Hence, there is interdependence between the distribution of future arbitrage opportunities and the individual
strategies of the arbitrageurs.
First, I describe the available assets in the economy, then I introduce traders and finally I present arbitrageurs.
2.1. ASSETS
There are two markets represented by two islands, i = A, B. On each island a single risky asset is traded. I will call them
A-asset and B-asset respectively. Both assets are in zero net supply. The two assets of the two islands have identical
payoff structure: both pays a R(t
d 
) dividend regularly, at each time of dt = ∆
d
,2∆
d
..., where R(t
d 
) is random, i.i.d., and
distributed according to the cumulative distribution function F (R) of bounded support with mean E (R) and ∆
d
is an arbi-
trary positive constant. Time is infinite and except of the discreet timing of the dividend payments, the time of the model,
t, is continuous. A riskless bond with a zero net return is available on both islands as a storage technology.
2.2. LOCAL TRADERS AND THE WINDOW OF ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITY
Each island is inhabited by a continuum of local traders: A-traders live on island A and B-traders live on island B. Each
local traders can trade only with the asset on her own island
6
and they are price takers. In the main text, I take local
traders’ demand curves as the primitives of the model. I provide possible microfoundations for the demand curve in
Appendix A.1.
The inverse demand curve of a representative local trader on island i in a given period t is 
for i = A, B where θ i(t) is the demand for the asset for the given price and p~i (h)
h>t
is a stochastic function representing
the possible prices in all periods of the future. The arbitrage possibility arises because demand curves differ initially
across the two islands. Demand curves differ until a random time t
~
. In particular, for any t > t
~
i.e., for the same possible future prices A-traders are willing to hold the same amount of assets only for a higher price.
At period t
~
, the demand curves jump to the same level to 
where p
~c
(h)
h>t
is the stochastic function of future prices when demand curves coincide. I call the interval between time
0 and t
~
a window of arbitrage opportunity of random length. I also use the term that the window is open before time t
~
and closes at time t
~
. The distribution of t
~
is exponential: given that the window is still open, in each instant there is a con-
stant probability δ that the window closes. To endogenize price process when the window is closed, in Appendix  I allow
MNB WORKING PAPERS · 2006/68
2. A simple model of risky arbitrage
6
As my focus is not the source of the arbitrage possibility, I take market segmentation for local traders as given. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Zigrand
(2004) use similar assumptions. Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005) provide a mechanism which results in endogenous market segmentation.
for the possibility of reopening windows. However, in the main text we focus only on the first window, so for all practical
purposes, we can think of the random time t
~
as the end of the model-time and the price of the asset when the window
is closed, p
A
(t
~
) = p
B
(t
~
) = p
C
, as an exogenous constant. This treatment simplifies the exposition without changing the
results.
From the point of view of the analysis, the exact cause of the temporary difference in the demand curves is immaterial.
It can be an asymmetric shock to risk-aversion, to local traders’ income or any other type of demand shock.
7
The struc-
ture intends to catch the intuition that prices of similar assets which are traded by different groups of traders can tem-
porarily differ if arbitrageurs do not eliminate the price gap. The focus of this analysis is the activity of arbitrageurs in such
cases.
To be able to concentrate on arbitrageurs’ activity, it is necessary to keep the behavior of local traders as simple as pos-
sible. An important simplification is that the inverse demand of local traders does not have backward looking compo-
nents.
Assumption 1 The inverse demand curves d
i
(θ i(t), p~ (h)
h>t
do not depend on past holdings of local traders or past prices,
θ i(u) , p (u), for u < t; and i = A;B.
This assumption implies that the analysis abstracts away from the wealth effects of past gains or losses on local traders’
demand. In the microfoundation provided in Appendix A.1, these features are justified by new local traders entering in
each time instant with fixed trading horizon. However, the intuition of the main results would also go through with more
general demand functions.
Assumption 1 and the i.i.d. distribution of dividends are the reasons of the fact that the only source of uncertainty influenc-
ing prices will be the state of the window.
8
Hence, the conditional distribution of future prices p
~i 
(h)
h>t
given that t > t
~
is
characterized by p
c
and a deterministic function: 
where p
~i 
(h)
h>t
is the price in island i in period h if the window is still open. Hence, we can write the inverse demand func-
tions as 
(1)
Naturally, all realized prices depend on the equilibrium actions of different group of agents.
For a moment, let us assume that there are no arbitrageurs who trade between markets, so both markets have to clear
separately. I will refer to this case as autarchy. In autarchy, the aggregate supply of the risky asset which has to be held
on each island is zero unit. It is natural to suspect that the price process will remain constant if neither the quantity,     nor
the state of the window changes, i.e. in autarchy θ i(t) = 0 hence pi (t) ≡ pi* Hence, autarchy prices of pA*, pB* are given as
the solution of the following equations 
(1)
(2)
A SIMPLE MODEL OF RISKY ARBITRAGE
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In the appendix, an example is provided where initially local traders have different, non-tradable, stochastic endowments which implies different hedging
needs. This difference in the endowment disapears in period    
8
This would not be true if arbitrageurs, who give the other side of the market, were allowed to use the same external randomization device to coordinate
their actions. As I discuss it at the presentation of the arbitrageurs, I rule this possibility out.
where the constant as the second argument of the demand functions denotes a constant function. The next assumption
states that autarchy prices are well defined. This is guaranteed in the example provided in Appendix A.1.
Assumption 2 There is a unique solution, p
A
*; p
B
* of equations (2)-(3) for p
c
and p
B
* < p
c
< p
A
*:
In the absence of arbitrageurs, the gap between the prices of the two assets is constant. In particular, g* ≡ p
A
* – p
B
*,
when the window is open and it is g* ≡ p 
A
*– p
B 
* when the gap is closed. Without loss of generality I will assume that 
g
A
* > 0. Since in autarchy the gap is constant until the uncertain time when it closes, it would provide a safe an very prof-
itable bet for anyone who could trade on both markets.
The following assumptions ensure that the inverse demand curves are well behaving.
Assumption 3 For any future prices, p
c
, p
i
(h)
h>t
where p
A
(h)
h>t
, p
B
(h)
h>t  
∈ [p
B
*, p
A
*], there exists a positive, finite, mini-
mal θ– = θ– (pA (h)
h>t 
, p
B
(h)
h>t 
) such that
Assumption 4 Let us define θ–max as
Then the inverse demand functions, d
i
(θ i (t), p i (h)
h>t
, p
c
), i = A, B exist, continuous and di¤erentiable in t for any 
θ A (t) ∈ [0, – θ–max], θ B (t) ∈ [0, – θ–max] and pA (h)
h>t
, p
B
(h)
h>t
∈ [p
B
*, p
A
*]
Assumption 5 Let us suppose that there is a θ + which satisfies
where the constant as the second argument of the demand functions denote a constant function. Then p
A
+ – p
B+
> g*
implies θ +< 0 and pA+ – pB+ < 0 implies + θ +> 0: Furthermore, for every such θ + there are sufficiently small open sets
around θ + and p i+ that the inverse demand function is continuous in these sets.
Assumption 6 Suppose that (p
i+
(h)
h≥t , p
c
, θ i+ (t)) and (pi– (h)
h≥t , p
c
, θ i– (t)) are two combinations of prices and quantities
which satisfy the demand function for trader i. and θ A+ (t), θ A– (t) ∈ [0, θ max], θ B+ (t), θ B– (t) ∈ [–θ max, 0], and pi+ (h)
h>t 
, 
p
i–
(h)
h>t
∈ p
B
*; p
A
*. If for all h > t which , the distribution of possible pay-offs p
~+i
(h) – p
+i
(t) + ~R
h
stochastically
dominates p
~+i
(h) – p
–i
(t) + R
~
h
in the first order sense; then θ +i (t) > θ –i (t).
Assumption 3 is an innocuous requirement that the price gap can be eliminated with sufficiently large, opposite positions
on the two markets. Assumption 4 defines a relevant domain where continuous inverse demand functions has to exist.
Assumption 5 is a week regularity requirement which has to hold outside of this relevant domain of the inverse demand
functions. It requires that as long as arbitrageurs keep selling the expensive A asset and buying the cheap B asset and
the price gap remains constant if the window survives, the gap cannot increase above g*. Similarly, as long as arbi-
trageurs do the opposite, the price of the B-asset cannot exceed the price of the A-asset. Although, I will use Assumption
6 in other ways in the proofs too, its main role that it directly implies that the inverse demand functions are downward
sloping in the relevant domain.
Lemma 1 For any θ A (t) ∈ [θ
–
max
, 0], θ B (t) ∈ [0, –θ
–
max
] and p
A
(h)
h>t
, p
B
(h)
h>t 
∈ [p
B
*, p
A
*], .
In Appendix A.1 I show that Assumptions 1-6 are automatically satisfied under some standard assumptions about the
utility functions of local traders.
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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2.3. ARBITRAGEURS
Because of the asymmetric demand shocks on the two markets, if markets on the two islands clear separately, there will
be a price differential of g* between asset prices, although the assets have identical dividend structure. Arbitrageurs can
reduce this gap by taking positions on both markets. Arbitrageurs are the model-equivalent of global hedge funds with
the resources and the expertise to discover such price anomalies and to take positions in distant local markets.
Arbitrageurs live forever, they are risk neutral and operate in a competitive environment: they are small and they have a
unit mass. Arbitrageurs take positions x
i
(t) on island i = A, B. To keep our analysis simple I assume that arbitrageurs
face with symmetric local markets in the following sense.
Assumption 7 If p
A
(h) – p
c
= p
c
– p
B
(h) for all h > t then
The main reason to make this assumption is to ensure that arbitrageurs take exactly opposite positions on the two mar-
kets, i.e., x
A
(t) = –x
B
t) = x (t). If markets are symmetric, choosing an optimal strategy for one of the markets and do the
exact opposite on the other markets must be optimal. This property makes the model much more tractable without the
loss of any significant intuitive content.
9
We can interpret this property that arbitrageurs engage in market neutral arbi-
trage trades. I call the composite asset of one long unit of the B-asset and one short unit of the A-asset the gap asset. 
I will show that in equilibrium x (t) is non-negative, i.e., arbitrageurs always buy the cheap asset and sell the more expen-
sive one. I will label such strategy as short selling x (t) unit of the gap.
Note that if arbitrageurs were not financially constrained, the strategy of short selling the gap would be riskless and would
lead to unbounded profit. However, because of the financial constraints specified below, sometimes arbitrageurs are
forced to liquidate before the prices of the assets converge, which can (and in equilibrium will) lead to losses. In effect,
their strategy is neutral only to the random payoff of the assets, R(t
d 
), but not to the endogenous fluctuations of relative
prices caused by the random time of t
~
and arbitrageurs’ trades. Consequently, their arbitrage strategy is risky.
When the window is closed, demand curves in the two markets coincide, the arbitrage opportunity disappears and arbi-
trageurs stay inactive. This validates are treatment of the price p
c
as a constant. I focus on the dynamic strategies of arbi-
trageurs during the interval of the open window of arbitrage opportunity. From the assumptions on the demand of traders,
it is simple to construct the inverse demand function for the gap asset 
which determines the gap g (t) ≡ p
A
(t) – p
B
(t) as a function of arbitrageurs’ aggregate position x
–
(t) and future prices
given that the window is still open. To keep the notation clear, I use g
~ 
(t) for the size of the gap as a stochastic function
while g (t) will denote the realized gap in the case that t < t
~
, i.e., the conditional distribution of g
~ 
(h)
h>t
given that the win-
dow was open in time t is 
Because of Assumption 7, prices on the two markets will be always symmetric: g (t) = 2 (p
A
(t) – p
c
). Thus, we can use
the simpler notation of 
A SIMPLE MODEL OF RISKY ARBITRAGE
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The example of the microfoundation provided in Appendix  satisfies this property. Both Xiong (2001) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) make assumptions
to ensure that arbitrageurs do not take asymmetric positions across local markets. It simplifies the analysis substantially, because it implies that arbi-
trageurs’ trades are neutral to the uncertainty of assets’ payoff, R
t 
. Xiong (2001) makes a direct assumption, while Gromb and Vayanos (2002) assume
that traders have CARA utility and opposite endowment shocks very similarly to the structure in our example in Appendix A.1.
The assumptions on local demand curves also imply the most important properties of g (·). The inverse demand function
for the gap asset, f x
– 
(t), p
A
(h)
h>t 
, p
B
(h)
h>t
is exists and continuous if x
–
(t) [0, θ–max] and pi (h)
h>t
∈ [p
B
*; p
A
*] and it is decreas-
ing in x
–
(t). If there is no arbitrage activity either at present or in the future, the gap is g*. Thus, in terms of g (·), the
autarchy price is given as g* = g (0, g*).
Arbitrageurs are financially constrained by the following institutional environment. Each arbitrageur starts her activity with
the same amount of capital
10
, ν (0) = ν–
0
where ν–
0
is the aggregate capital available in the economy. They do not get any
extra funds as long as the window is open.
11
They need funds for their activity because arbitrageurs are required to fully
collateralize their potential losses. For example, if their largest potential loss on an invested unit in the next time instant
is g
·
(t) to take a position of the size 
,
an arbitrageur has to be able to present ν (t) cash, i.e., deposit ν (t) on a
margin account as the maximal possible loss on each unit is g
·
(t). This assumption can also be regarded as the formal-
ization of endogenous margin requirements or VaR constraints. Putting it another way, the assumption requires that the
marked-to-market value of arbitrageurs portfolios together with their capital always has to be non-negative. This con-
straint is clearly endogenous. When potential losses are large, arbitrageurs need to present more cash to be able to take
positions of a given size. This endogeneity will play an important role in the analysis.
We are looking for a rational expectation equilibrium of the problem. In this equilibrium, both local traders and arbi-
trageurs maximize their utility for given prices and both local markets clears. There are two sources of uncertainty in this
model.
12
Both risky assets pay the random dividend t
~
and the window disappears in the random time t
~
. However, the
structure of the model implies that we can reduce the stochastic problem into a deterministic one. First, Assumption
implies that the demand curves of local traders are independent of the realized dividend, R (t
d 
). Similarly, Assumption 7
implies that R (t
d 
) will not influence arbitrageurs’ pay-off, because it cancels out from the value of their portfolio. Hence,
the only relevant source of uncertainty is the state of the window. At the same time, it is clear what happens when the
window is closed. The gap disappears, arbitrageurs do not take any positions and local markets clear independently.
Consequently, to find the equilibrium we only have to find the conditional values of the equilibrium variables for each peri-
od t given that the window is still open at that time, t < t
~
. Thus, the problem of arbitrageurs reduces to the problem of 
(4)
The maximand shows that the relative probability that the window closes in time instant t is δe–δt . If this happens, the arbi-
trageur gains g (t) x (t) profit on her current holdings and she gets her cumulated profit or loss, v (t). The first constraint
shows the dynamics of the capital level of the arbitraguer. In each period, the capital level of the previous period is
adjusted for the current gains or losses, x (t) g
·
(t). The last inequality is the collateralization. constraint. It shows that arbi-
trageurs are not allowed to take a position in any period which would make them bankrupt if the window survived that
given period and if their liabilities are marked to market.
The solution of problem (4) is a continuous and differentiable function {x(t)}
∞
t=0
of conditionally optimal portfolios for each
period t, given that the window is still open, t < t
~
. This strategy has to be optimal given the continuous and differentiable
conditional gap path {g (t)}
∞
t=0
. It is an equilibrium if the aggregate positions {x
– 
(t)}
∞
t=0
support this conditional gap path, 
(5)
i.e., both local markets clear. In the next section I present the equilibrium.
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10
There is no significance of ν
0
being the same across arbitrageurs. The analysis would be virtually the same if the initial capital was distributed in any other
way.
11
In section 5 I will relax this assumption. 
12
I do not allow for an exogenous randomization device which could be used by arbitrageurs to coordinate their random actions. Hence, it is not possible
that all arbitrageurs decide to do simultaneously a certain action with a given probability and another action with some other probability. This would be
an additional source of uncertainty in the model.
In this section I present the unique robust equilibrium of the model. I proceed in two steps. In first part, I show that
generally the model has a continuum of equilibria. In the second part I show that only one of these equilibria is robust
to a simple and plausible perturbation of the model. Namely, if arbitrageurs have to pay an arbitrarily small shorting
fee for their portfolio holdings, all equilibria is eliminated but one. I discuss the implications of this robust equilibrium
in section 4.
3.1. EQUILIBRIA IN GENERAL
When arbitrageurs choose their strategy, they have to solve an intertemporal capital allocation problem. For each peri-
od, each of them has to decide how much of her capital to commit to the arbitrage at that period and how much of it to
save for later. The danger of saving capital for later is that the window might close today, and the arbitrageur might miss
out on the opportunity. The danger of committing the capital today is that if the window gets wider the arbitrageur will
have less capital for investing exactly when the possibility would be more profitable.
13
I argue that the aggregate investment plan {x
– 
(t)}
∞
t=0
and the conditional gap path {g (t)}
∞
t=0
in all but one equilibria (includ-
ing the only robust equilibrium) are characterized by the following three intuitive conditions.
1) The gap path, {g (t)}
∞
t=0
has to be such that each arbitrageur has to be indifferent in which period to invest a dollar,
because investing in any period gives the same positive expected profit.
2) The level of aggregate positions, {x
– 
(t)}
∞
t=0 
has to be such that markets clear for the given gap path, i.e., 
f (x
– 
(t), g p (h)
h>t 
) = g (t) for all t.
3) The sum of all possible aggregate losses exactly drains up the aggregate capital of arbitrageurs
(6)
i.e., the multiperiod budget constraint is binding.
These three conditions are sufficient to describe equilibria, because of the following logic. The first condition describes gap
paths where each arbitrageur is indifferent how to allocate her money between periods. Such indifference paths are possi-
ble, because arbitrageurs are risk-neutral. If investment in each period gives the same expected profit, they will be indiffer-
ent. With the help of the market clearing conditions, we can figure out the aggregate levels of investment which are consis-
tent with each g (t). If arbitrageurs have enough capital to follow this investment strategy in the aggregate, i.e., it does not
violate the aggregate budget constraint, the strategy will be feasible on the individual level as well. For example, each arbi-
trageur might follow the same strategy. In this case the aggregate variables coincide with the individual ones. Note also that
if all the three conditions are satisfied, the strategy must be optimal for the given prices. Increasing some investment level
is impossible because the budget constraint is binding. Cutting back positions in some periods to be able to increase posi-
tions in other periods is pointless as all periods give the same expected profit. Decreasing some positions to save some
money and not to commit it to any periods is suboptimal, because there is positive expected profit in each period.
Unless ν–
0
is very large
14
, this three conditions describe a continuum of conditional gap paths which are all increasing and
converge to a finite positive level less than or equal to g*. The conditional gap path typically has an S shape: convex for
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The provided arguments build on the fact that the aggregate position x
–
t
is always non-negative i.e. arbitrageurs never speculate on the widening of the
gap. We will show in the formal proof why it is the case. The intuition relies on the point that x
–
t
< 0 would be consistent only with a bubble path of g
t 
. But
a bubble path is not consistent with the finite level of aggregate capital of arbitrageurs.
14
When ν–
0
is very large, there is no gap path, {g(t)}
∞
t=0
and corresponding average position path, {x
– 
(t)}
∞
t=0
which would imply . It is so, because
the left hand side of the budget constraint is bounded from above. Arbitrageurs cannot lose more than g*θ
–
max
for any gap path where θ
–
max
is the maxi-
mal position which is needed to push down the gap to 0 defined in Assumption 4.
3. The robust equilibrium
small t and concave for large t. The qualitative properties of two of these paths are shown in Figure 1 together with the
corresponding paths of conditional average positions. Remember that the gap shows the conditional variables. In reali-
ty, only the beginning of the paths will be observed. For example, if the window closed at t
~ 
= 1, we would observe the
increasing path from g (0) to g (1) and then the gap would jump back to 0 at time 1. Hence, the increasing pattern implies
that as long as the window survives, the gap must increase and the average arbitrageur must suffer losses of x
– 
(t) g
·
(t) >
0. The increasing pattern is a consequence of the required indifference along the path. Let us suppose that between
time t and time t+∆t the gap path would not increase when the window survives. Then all arbitrageurs would invest only
in period t and no one would save money until t+∆t . The reason is that in this case the arbitrage opportunity is not get-
ting more profitable by t+∆t , but there is the chance that the window closes in the mean time. So any arbitrageur who
saves capital for t+∆t would risk to miss out on the arbitrage opportunity without any compensation in returns. The gap
has to increase if the window remains open to compensate those arbitrageurs who were ready to save some capital
instead of investing it right away.
It is important to see that the three conditions of the equilibrium determines only the average positions, x
– 
(t). Individual
positions are arbitrary, as long as the average is x
– 
(t). Thus, the equilibrium is equally consistent with a scenario where
each arbitrageur follows the aggregate strategy or, for example, where each arbitrageur is passive until a given t when
she takes a maximal position.
15
If in each time instant a given proportion µ (t) chooses to do so and holds,
this will be consistent with the equilibrium. In this latter version, there are “early-birds” and “crisis-hunters“. Early birds
enter even for a small gap and lose all of their capital, if the window survives and the gap widens. Crisis-hunters wait
until the gap widens considerably, early birds lose their capital and enter only then.
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Figure 1
The increasing curves show the qualitative features of the conditional gap paths, {g (t)}g ∞
t=0
in two possible equilibria. The
solid curve represents the equilibrium with the limit of lim
t→∞ g (t) = g∗ while the dashed curve shows another equilibri-
um where lim
t→∞ g (t) = g∞ < g*. The decreasing curve represents the conditional average position path {x
–
(t)}g ∞
t=0
corre-
sponding to the first conditional gap path. It must go to 0 and it must be positive. Its monotonicity is not guaranteed.
Conditional average position, x—(t)
t
Conditional gap, g(t)
g(t), x—(t)
g*
15
Intuitively, this would correspond to a threshold-strategy of entering the market if and only if the gap reaches g
t
.
Following the maximum principle
16
, the optimal decision is formally described by the first order condition 
(7)
where J′ (v (t)) is the marginal value function in period t which changes according to the differential equation 
(8)
The first order condition is a way to express our indifference requirement, if we rewrite it as 
The left hand side is the expected profit of investing a unit of capital today. One dollar buys a position of the size for
the arbitrageur, because this is the maximal position she can collateralize with the dollar. The window closes in the next
instant with probability δ so a position of gives expected profit. The right hand side shows that if she does
not invest this unit of capital, she gets the expected future profit per unit of capital, J′ (v (t)).
As the next theorem states the linear differential equations (7) and (8) together with the boundary conditions implied by
the multiperiod budget constraint (6) and the market clearing condition (5) gives simple solutions for the conditional gap
paths. I delegate the proof to Appendix A.2.
Theorem 1 There is a critical value ν–
0
max
that for any ν–
0
∈ (0, ν–
0
max
) the model has a continuum of equilibria characterized
by the conditional gap path, {g(t)}
∞
t=0
and conditional investment path, {x
–
(t)}
∞
t=0 
. In all of these equilibria, {g(t)}
∞
t=0  
is mono-
tonically increasing and it is given in the form of
The value g
∞
∈ (0, g*) is the limit of the series, and each feasible g
∞
determines an equilibrium. The path {g(t)}
∞
t=0  
pins
down the equilibrium aggregate investment levels, {x
–
(t)}
∞
t=0  
by the market clearing condition (5).
A given g
∞
is feasible, if  ν–
0
∈ (0, ν–
0
max, g∞), where 
Furthermore, ν–
0
max 
is defined as 
Proof The proof is in Appendix A.2.
It might seem counterintuitive that there is no equilibria where the gap remains constant at a positive level. As arbi-
trageurs have limited capital, one might expect that they would invest all their capital to the arbitrage which would push
down the gap to a positive level. Then they would hold the same position until the window closes. This would keep the
gap at this positive level as long as the window is open. The problem with this argument lies in the endogenous nature
of the capital constraint. Arbitrageurs are not constrained in the terms of the size of their position. They are constrained
in the terms of their capital level which they only have to use to collateralize their potential losses. If there are no poten-
tial losses, they are not constrained at all. So if the gap were constant in a given interval when the window is open, arbi-
trageurs could always invest more at the beginning of this interval. This would push the level of the gap down at the
beginning of the interval in line with an increasing conditional gap path.
THE ROBUST EQUILIBRIUM
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See e.g. the economist-friendly presentation of Obstfeld (1992).
As the next Theorem states, there is one equilibrium which violates one of the three conditions described above. In this
equilibrium the conditional gap path is not increasing, but constant at the zero level, i.e., g (t) = 0 for all t. As this pro-
vide zero return on investment in any of the periods, arbitrageurs are indifferent between the periods. Just as before, the
aggregate positions are given by the market clearing condition, g (t) = f (x
– 
(t), 0). However, the budget constraint will not
bind because the sum all potential losses in this equilibrium is 0. Arbitrageurs could increase their positions, but there is
no point to do so. The expected profit on any strategy is zero. The corresponding strategy profile will never violate the
collateralization. Constraint, because arbitrageurs are not limited if there are no potential losses.
Theorem 2 For any ν–
0
there is an equilibrium where g (t) = 0 for all t. This is the only additional equilibrium which is not
described by Theorem 1.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix A.2.
Intuitively, the multiplicity of equilibria can be seen as a coordination problem. The g (t) = 0 equilibrium is achievable,
but for this arbitrageurs should coordinate their future actions, i.e., they have to push down the gap in all states. As a
consequence, there will be no losses in any state of the world, arbitrageurs do not have to provide collateral for their
trades and the equilibrium is consistent with the budget constraint. Alternatively, if arbitrageurs coordinate on an equi-
librium with positive and increasing conditional gap path, the collateral constraint will be relevant because losses are
possible. In the following section, we will see that this coordination problem disappears by a small and plausible pertur-
bation of the model. Although the equilibrium where the gap is always fully eliminated seems intuitive, this – similarly to
all other equilibria but one – does not survive this equilibrium selection mechanism. This will leave us with the unique
robust equilibrium where the conditional gap path is increasing and it converges to g*.    
3.2. EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
I introduce a small perturbation to the model to select one of the many possible equilibria. Let us assume that there is a
small positive unit cost
16
, m of short selling the gap. If an arbitrageur takes a position of x (t) she has to pay a cost of 
x (t) m. This is the carry cost of the position. The level of m is arbitrary as long as it is small in the following sense: 
(9)
This perturbation changes Problem (4) only to the extent that the constraint for the development of the capital level is
modified to ν· (t) = – (g· (t) + m) x (t).
We will see that this modified version have a unique equilibrium for any positive ν–
0
level. It will also turn out that as 
m → ∞ the equilibrium converges to an equilibrium of the m = 0 case, the one where g
∞
= g* and 
Intuitively, the main reason why an arbitrarily small exogenous holding cost eliminates all but one equilibria lies in the
budget constraint. In any equilibria but the one where the conditional gap path converges to g* arbitrageurs commit to
invest at non-diminishing level for arbitrarily long. Even if the cost of investing is very small, sustaining such strategy for
a very long time has the potential to be extremely costly. Formally, the sum of all potential losses, 
(10)
can converge only if lim
t →∞ x
–
(t) = 0. This implies that the conditional gap path must converge to g*.
17
It is also intuitive to follow the construction of the unique equilibrium when m>0. The qualitative features of this equilibri-
um is shown on Figure 2. The graph shows that if the window survives until time T, from time T on that period on arbi-
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Assuming positive cost of holding is not the only way to eliminate all equilibria, but the robust equilibrium. For example, assuming positive cost of capi-
tal, i.e., that arbitrageurs pay back a fixed share of v
0
to their investors in each period until they realize profit, would lead to very similar results.
trageurs do not take any positions and the conditional gap remains at the autarchy level g* as long as it remains open.
Otherwise, the equilibrium is very similar to the equilibria with increasing conditional gap paths described in the previ-
ous section. Before T the conditional gap path monotonically increases. The conditional gap path typically has an S
shape here as well: convex for small t and concave for large t.
The equilibrium is constructed backwards. The first point to make that there must be a T that arbitrageurs lose all their
capital if the window lasts at least T periods. Thus, g (t) = g* for all t ≥ T if t < t
~
. We know already that with positive hold-
ing cost, the gap path must approach g*, i.e., lim
t →∞ g (t) = g* . In the case of m = 0 this was consistent with a gap path,
where all arbitrageurs were indifferent between the time of their investment and still g (t) < g* for all t. This is not the case
when m > 0. Let us do the following thought experiment. Let us suppose that the arbitrageur arrives to period t with 1
unit of capital and the window is still open. Let us also suppose that she considers the following two options. She either
invests this unit right away or waits until period t + ∆t. The following inequality shows her expected profit in both cases 
(11)
where the left hand side is her expected profit if she invests her dollar in t and holds a maximum position of while
the right hand side is the expected profit if she waits until (t+dt). Along the equilibrium path with only interior solutions,
she would be indifferent between the two. Note that the terms in the brackets are getting more similar as t grows: 
lim
t →∞ g (t) = g* implies that limt →∞ g (t) – g (t + ∆t) = limt →∞ g
⋅
(t) – g
⋅
(t + ∆t) = 0 Note also that in the limit, the left hand
side is always larger as 
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Figure 2
The qualitative features of the equilibrium conditional gap path, {g (t)}g∞
t=0
; and the average position of arbitrageurs, 
{x
–
(t)}∞
t=0
. The average position path is not guaranteed to be monotonic. Both variables are plotted conditionally on the
window of arbitrage opportunity being still open at time t:
Conditional gap, g(t)
g(t), x—(t)
g*
T t
Conditional average position, x—(t)
Intuitively, if the market tomorrow and today is very similar, there is no point to wait and risk to miss out on the opportu-
nity. Thus, there must be a large enough T, that at the instant before T the left hand side of (11) is strictly larger so arbi-
trageurs decide to invest all their capital and risk to lose all this capital if the window survives until T. Thus, x
–
= 0 and
g (t) = g* for all t ≥ T.
The observation that by T, arbitrageurs would be happy to invest all their remaining capital implies that the marginal value
function at T is given by this strategy is 
Hence, with the help of the perturbed versions of (7) and (8) 
and with the boundary condition g (T) = g*, we can construct the equilibrium conditional gap path backwards from time
T. This path will be monotonously increasing and makes each arbitrageur indifferent in which period to invest before T.  
The last remaining question is where we should stop with this process: what is the value of T ? Time T is pinned down
by the budget constraint. In equilibrium, if the window survives, by period T arbitrageurs have to use up all their capital
to validate the definition of T, i.e., 
(12)
The proof of the next theorem ensures that this procedure indeed leads to a unique equilibrium.
Theorem 3 There is a unique equilibrium in the economy in terms of average positions, which consists of a period T a
path of average positions {x
–
(t)}
∞
t=0  
and a conditional gap path {g (t)}
∞
t=0 
. The equilibrium is characterized by the follow-
ing expressions: 
(13)
and 
(14)
Furthermore, {g (t)}
T
t=0 
is strictly monotonically increasing in t.
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Proof Details of the proof are in Appendix A.2.
After the construction of the equilibrium with m > 0 it might be unsurprising that as m diminish, T increases without bound
and the equilibrium converges to the equilibrium described in Theorem 1 with g
∞
= g*. After all, the equilibrium with 
m > 0 is also determined by the indifference condition, the market clearing condition and the budget constraint and we
also know that any arbitrarily small holding cost rules out any equilibria where lim
t→∞ ≠ g*. This is why I call the equilibri-
um where g
∞
= g* the robust equilibrium of the system. This result is summarized in the next Proposition.
Theorem 4 If v
–
0
∈ (0,v
–
0
max,g*
), as m → 0, the equilibrium of the perturbed system with m > 0 converges to the equilibrium
described in Theorem 1 where 
(16)
Proof The proof is in Appendix A.2.
In the next section I discuss the properties of the robust equilibrium.
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The main observation of this model is that arbitrageurs’ individually optimal strategies transform the arbitrage opportuni-
ty in a systematic way. First of all, arbitrageurs create their own potential losses. Remember the assumption that if arbi-
trageurs were not present on the market, the gap between the prices could never increase. Hence, the first arbitrageur
who could bet (without affecting prices) on the convergence would make a sure profit without having the chance of suf-
fering a loss in any time point. However, as soon as a positive mess of arbitrageur enter the market, in each period when
the window remains open, the gap increases. The average arbitrageur loses some capital.
It is interesting to contrast the presence of endogenous losses with the intuition of other models of limits to arbitrage, e.g.,
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Liu and Longstaff (2004). They all emphasize
that arbitrageurs might lose money because they might be forced to liquidate early if the gap widens. However, in those
models the initial widening of the gap happens for reasons which are exogenous to the arbitrageurs’ strategies. In par-
ticular, it is a result of noise traders trading against fundamentals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Xiong, 2001, Gromb and
Vayanos, 2002) or an exogenously specified price process (Liu and Longstaff, 2004). These models focus on different
mechanisms which amplify the first exogenous shock. In contrast, the mechanism of my model is not based on an ampli-
fication argument. If arbitrageurs do not trade, the price gap cannot widen in any way. The possibility of diverging prices
is the equilibrium consequence of arbitrageurs individually optimal actions..
The mechanism of this model is based on an efficiency argument. In this respect, it bears some resemblance to the stan-
dard text-book case for efficient markets. In the text-book equilibrium, different prices for assets with the same cash-flows
cannot exist, because they would provide a very attractive opportunity for arbitrageurs. Thus, arbitrageurs would instant-
ly make large bets on the convergence, which would automatically eliminate the anomaly by pushing the prices to the
same level. The robust equilibrium gap path of my model is sustained by a similar mechanism. Along the gap path, each
arbitrageur is indifferent when to invest. However, if in any time, the gap were above the equilibrium path, it would pro-
vide a very attractive opportunity for the arbitrageurs. All of them would prefer to save money until this time instant and
invest all if the window is still open. But this would push back the gap to the equilibrium level. Similarly, no one would
invest at times in which the gap is below the equilibrium path, which would increase the gap at that period up to the equi-
librium level. The main difference here compared to the text-book case is that the aggregate capital level of arbitrageurs
is limited, so the gap is not fully eliminated. In this sense, we can label the equilibrium price gap as “limited-arbitrage-
free prices”.
18
Probably, the most intuitive way to see how arbitrageurs action transforms the arbitrage opportunity is to have a look on
the effect on the predictability of the gap. As we expect from an arbitrage opportunity, in autarchy the expected change
of the gap is highly predictable from the current gap: 
i.e., prices are expected to converge. In the robust equilibrium, from equation (16) 
(17)
with 
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4. Comparative statics and discussion
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Another potentially important difference here compared to the text-book case is that arbitrageurs have to compare current prices with expected future
prices to decide on their actions. In the text-book arbitrage trades they only have to realize a mismatch in contemporanous prices. Thus, possibly our
mechanism requires more sophisticated arbitrageurs. As real-world equivalents of arbitrageurs are hedge funds, institutions considered to be among the
most sophisticated investors, this should not be a problem.
where M
t,h 
(v
–
0 
) depends on v
–
0
through g
0 
. In following proposition, we will see that although the difference 
(18)
is always positive, it is decreasing and goes to zero as the level of capital increases towards its maximum, v
–
0
max,g*
. Thus,
although the gap is always expected to decrease, as there are more and more arbitrageurs enter the market, the gap
approaches a martingale process. Arbitrageurs’ competition with limited capital turn arbitrage into standard speculative
bets where the probability-weighted gains are – almost – equal to the probability weighted losses.
Proposition 1 In the robust equilibrium
1) for any fixed t, and
2) as v
–
0
→ v
–
0
max,g*
, g (t) approaches a martingale 
Proof It is clear from the proof of Theorem 1 that and lim
v
–
0
→
v
–
0
max,g* g
0 
= 0. All statements of the proposition are
straightforward consequences of this fact and equations (16), (17) and 
(19)
from the proof of Theorem 1.
The fact that more arbitrage-capital in the market pushes the arbitrage opportunity into the direction of a standard spec-
ulative asset also sheds some new light on pricing anomalies like “Siamese twin stocks”
19
. This model suggests that if
we believe that arbitrageurs have limited capital, we should not valuate positive gaps between very similar assets as
the lack of arbitrage activity. The gap is never fully eliminated by arbitrageurs. What we should check is to what extent
these price gaps move in a predictable way. If there is a strong mean reversion then it indeed suggests a week arbi-
trage activity. However, if the gap process moves in a rather unpredictable way, it might be a sign of active influence
of rational arbitrageurs.
Another way to look at the effect of arbitrageurs’ competition on prices is to analyze the expected profit of arbitrage. Note
that the value function at time 0, J (v
0 
) is the expected profit of an arbitrageur by definition, 
where the last equation comes from expression (19). From Proposition 1, it is clear that more aggregate arbitrage-
capital decreases the available expected profit. This is quite intuitive if we think of the aggregate level of capital is the
measure of arbitrageurs who know about the arbitrage opportunity. If the arbitrage opportunity is widely known among
potential arbitrageurs then they all enter the market and the available profit is reduced by the competition. But if only
few arbitrageurs find a new opportunity, they can expect large expected profit. This is also consistent with the reduc-
tion of predictability when the arbitrage capital is high in the market. Less predictable prices provide less expected
profit.
Given its level of abstraction, it might be surprising that – under certain circumstances – this model can also generate
the skewed distribution of returns observed in the data. In particular, in the robust equilibrium the distribution of the aver-
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See Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Froot and Dabora (1999) for details.
age arbitrageur’s total return is skewed toward the left
20
if the level of aggregate positions is decreasing, .
21
This
is so, because in this case, the realized return on capital of the average arbitrageur given that the window closes at t
~
,
is decreasing with the length of the window. Intuitively, the average arbitrageur loses capital as the window
gets longer, if her position decreases, because if she liquidates a part of her portfolio as the gap widens, she suffers
losses on the liquidated units. She makes a net gain if the window closes instantly as , but if the window is
long enough, she loses most of her capital. Since longer windows occur with smaller probability, the average arbitrageur
will make a positive net return with large probability and larger losses with smaller probability during each window. The
next lemma shows the formal result.
Proposition The density function of the average arbitrageur’s gross return in each opportunity is given by 
for all t
~
>0
where is decreasing in t
~
if and . Thus, if this distribution is skewed
toward the left.
Proof The statement is the direct consequence of the exponential distribution of t
~
and 
In the next section, I present a calibrated example to quantify the risk and level of endogenous losses in equilibrium.
4.1. A CALIBRATED EXAMPLE
A simple calibration exercise is illustrated by Figure 3. The increasing curves show three conditional gap paths of the
robust equilibrium corresponding to three different δ values ( )21. The decreasing curves show the
total gross return of the average arbitrageur for different δ values given that the window closes in period t~,
I use the CARA-symmetric framework defined in Appendix A.1 for the specification of the inverse demand function  
f (x
–
(t), g (h)
h>t 
). I choose parameters
22
which imply g* = 2. With these parameters Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
23
For
the calibration I assume that each unit interval corresponds to a week. Then I choose the aggregate level of capital, v
–
0
in each case in a way to ensure that the annualized return of an average arbitrageur following the optimal strategy cor-
responds to the historical average return of hedge funds between 1994-2000 (see Agarwal and Naik, 2004).
24
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20
We analyze the arbitrageurs’ total return during a window of arbitrage opportunity, instead of their period per period return. On one hand it is reasonable
as the observed skewness of hedge funds’ returns in the empirical literature (e.g. Agarwal and Naik, 2004) comes from monthly or quaterly data, while in
our calibration excercise a period corresponds to a week and the expected length of a window ranges from 9 days to 1 month. On the other hand, the fact
that the length of a window is a random variable while returns in the empirical literature are calculated for a fixed interval makes the interpretation harder.
For results on the distribution of returns for a fixed interval, more structure would be needed on the distribution of arbitrage opportunities an arbitrageur
can find during a fixed interval. However, as long as the interval is long relative to the expected length of a window, our result is expected to hold.
21
These δ values imply that the window survives any unit interval with probability ¼, ½ and ¾ respectively.
22
In terms of the example in the appendix, I choose a level of absolute risk aversion of α = 0.5 the size of the endowment shock is ω = 1 and the variance
of the dividend rate is σ 2 = 1.
23
We show in Appendix A.1.1 how to determine g* from the primitives and how to ensure that Assumptions 1-3 are satisfied.
24
The annualized return is calculated by valuating the marginal value function at period 0 and by using the fact that expected length of the window is 1/δ
weeks by the properties of the exponential distribution. In each case the annualized net return is 17.23%. The Matlab 7.0 code of the calibration exercise
is available on request from the author.
COMPARATIVE STATICS AND DISCUSSION
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Figure 3
The increasing curves show the conditional gap paths of the robust equilibrium, g(t); while the decreasing curves show
the realized gross return on capital, ; if the window closes at t for three different δ values ( δ = , no marks,
δ = , stars, δ = ; triangles). The inverse demand function f (x (t), {g (h)}
h>t
and g* = 1.03 is determined by the
CARA-symmetric framework with parameters α = 0:4; ω = 1; R = 1. Aggregate level of capital v–
0
is chosen in a way that
the expected return of the average hedge fund matches its empirical counterpart in Agarwal and Naik (2004).
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The distribution of realized returns of the average arbitrageur for an arbitrage opportunity for the case of δ = :
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The main lesson from the calibration exercise is that even in the limit equilibrium, price effects from the competition of
arbitrageurs alone can explain episodes when arbitrageurs lose most of their capital relatively fast. Consistently with
Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, Figure 3 illustrates that the longer the window the wider the gap and the larger the loss of the
average arbitrageur. In particular, the total gross return on capital exceeds one if the window closes early. Hence, arbi-
trageurs make a positive profit only in these large probability cases. If the window survives longer, the average arbi-
trageur loses a larger proportion of her capital. The following two tables quantify our observations. 
The first table shows the minimum length of the window (rounded to the nearest half unit) which is necessary to wipe out
a given proportion of the initial capital of arbitrageurs, while the second table shows the corresponding probabilities of
these events. For example, the second cell of first row in the first table shows that if δ = – ln ½ and the window remains
open for at least 5 weeks, the average arbitrageur will make a negative net return. The same cell in the second table
shows that this happens with the probability of 2.2%. The second cell in the second row of the tables show that if the
window is still open after 2 and a half month, the average arbitrageur loses 50% of her initial capital and the probability
of this event is 1%. This may seem a small probability event, but it is important to note that this is the probability of such
crisis if arbitrageurs bet in a single window of arbitrage opportunity. When δ = – ln ½ the expected length of a window
is about 10 days. Most probably arbitrageurs would take positions in a large number of subsequent windows in each
year. Hence, the probability that one of these windows is long enough to generate a crisis with substantial losses can be
significant.
Finally, Figure  illustrates the distribution of the total gross return of the average arbitrageur in a window of arbitrage
opportunity for the case of δ = – ln 0.75. The distributions for the other two cases are very similar. The Figure demon-
strates – consistently with Lemma 2 – that the average arbitrageur will make a small profit most of the time, while she will
make large losses infrequently.
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weeks δ = – ln ¼ δ = – ln ½ δ = – ln ¾
0% 3 5 10
50% 5.5 9.5 19.5
90% 10 12.5 27
% δ = – ln ¼ δ = – ln ½ δ = – ln ¾
0% 0.7 2.2 4.8
50% 0.01 1 0.3
99% 10
–7
0.01 0.05
The main observation of this model is that arbitrageurs following their individually optimal strategies create losses
endogenously. Their competition does not eliminate the price gap fully, but reduces the predictability of relative price
movements: transforms the arbitrage opportunity into a speculative bet. I expect that this result is robust to a wide range
of set-ups, but I consider three of the assumptions particularly important for this result. The first one is that the duration
of the window of arbitrage opportunity is uncertain and, in particular, that it can be arbitrarily long. An example for the
departure from this assumption is Gromb and Vayanos (2002). They assume a window with a fixed length i.e. the gap
disappears in an exogenously fixed period. They show – in contrast with our result – that the gap path will typically
decrease in that case. The other critical assumption is that arbitrageurs take both prices and the probability of conver-
gence as given. Zigrand (2004) presents a model where there is imperfect competition among arbitrageurs, while Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2002,2003) analyze the case where arbitrageurs are strategic and the time of convergence is deter-
mined in equilibrium. The third important assumption is that there is no capital inflow into the market during the window
of arbitrage opportunity. In this section, I focus on the implications of relaxing this assumption.
I argue that the effect of more flexible capital supply in the industry depends on the exact way we think about it. One
view is that as the gap gets wider and the arbitrage opportunity gets more profitable, so we should expect more capital
to enter into the industry. I will focus on this argument in the next section and show that in certain scenarios the equilib-
rium remains virtually unchanged, even if there is a positive relationship between profitability and the level of the enter-
ing capital. Another argument is related to the agency view of the arbitrage sector. Hedge funds (arbitrageurs) get their
capital from investors who delegate their portfolio decisions hoping that hedge funds know and have access to better
opportunities. However, there investors do not have exact information on the abilities and opportunities of hedge funds.
Hence, investors use arbitrageurs’ past performance as a signal about their abilities. If this effect is strong, there might
even be a capital outflow from the market when the gap increases as this is the time when arbitrageurs lose money. Here
I do not consider this case, but in Kondor (2006) I adjust the current set up with a formal model of this agency problem
and analyze the additional effects on arbitrageurs strategies and equilibrium prices in detail.
5.1. PARTIALLY FLEXIBLE CAPITAL SUPPLY: REACHING FOR YIELD
Let us suppose that there is a positive relationship between the expected profit in the arbitrage market and the level of
capital inflow in a given period. The idea is that there is an external pool of investors who are faced with different costs
or outside options. In each period they decide whether to enter the arbitrage market for the given prices and future
opportunities. As the arbitrage market gets more profitable, more investors decide to join. This is consistent with the
anecdotal evidence that fund managers enter more risky markets when safer opportunities do not provide sufficient prof-
it, i.e., they “reach for yield”. The simplest formalization for such a relationship is to assume that there is one such pool
of potential entrants of unit measure with aggregate capital v
– E
and they all enter if the expected profit per unit of capital
from the arbitrage opportunity exceeds the threshold J 
+
. I will show that as long as v
– E
or J 
+ 
is relatively small, this exten-
sion does not change the qualitative properties of the equilibrium.
The idea is related to the fact that the equilibrium of the model is consistent with a scenario when arbitrageurs follow het-
erogenous strategies. For example, there might be early birds, who concentrate their investments into early periods and
lose all their capital if the window survives longer, while there might also be crisis hunters who are sitting on the sideline
and waiting for long windows when early birds already lost their capital and the gap is wider. Only the measure of arbi-
trageurs following different strategies has to be consistent with the aggregate investment level described by the equilib-
rium. Notice, that crisis hunters in the original set-up and new entrants in the current extension are following the exact
same strategy. They enter the market only when the gap is wide enough. Thus, we only have to make sure that the meas-
ure of new entrants is consistent with the equilibrium. Then, new entrants can play the role of crisis hunters while incum-
bents will concentrate their investment on the early periods.
The following proposition states the result.
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5. Robustness
Proposition Suppose that a unit measure of incumbents with aggregate capital level  v
– I 
enter the arbitrage market in peri-
od 0 and a unit measure of new entrants with aggregate capital level  v
– E
enter the market only if the expected profit per
unit of capital reaches the J 
+
threshold. Let {v
–
(t)}
∞
t=0  
is the series of aggregate capital levels in the robust equilibrium in
which v
–
0
= v
– E
+ v
– I
and τ the time in which v– (t) = v– E.If 
(20)
the robust equilibrium with new entrants coincides with the robust equilibrium without new entrants where v
–
0
= v
– E
+ v
– I
.
Proof Let κ the time when J′ (v(k)) = J +. Thus κ ≤ τ This will be the time when new entrants enter. Let ∆v– = v– (κ) – v– E,
where ∆v–  ≥ 0 because J′ (v(t)) is increasing in t. Let . Then if {x– (t)}∞
t=0 
are the equilibrium positions without new
entrants when v
–
0
= v
– E
+ v
– I
, then the aggregate investment levels 
are consistent with the equilibrium with new entrants, because the indifference condition and the market clearing condi-
tion holds and 
It should be clear that because of the same argument as in the case of one group of potential entrants, there can be sev-
eral group of new entrants each of them entering at different threshold as long as the aggregate capital of each of these
groups is small enough. Thus, a general positive relationship between new capital and profitability is consistent with our
equilibrium. However, two points are critical in this argument. The first one is that the outside pool of capital cannot be
too large. If (20) did not hold, all the increasing equilibria of Theorem 1 would disappear and we would end up with the
only equilibrium of Theorem 2 which is not robust. The second point is that the relationship between profitability and new
entrants is deterministic in this extension. Incumbents expect new entrants, this is why they concentrate their activity on
the early periods. However, this point is not critical. One could imagine a stochastic relationship where a wider gap
increases the chance of larger capital entry. Thus, the larger the gap the larger the chance that it will be shut down by
outside arbitrageurs. But this could be formalized by time-dependent q values which would not change the main quali-
tative features of the equilibrium.
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In this paper I present an analytically tractable general equilibrium model of dynamic arbitrage. In our model arbitrage
opportunities arise because of a temporary pressure on local demand curves of two very similar assets traded in seg-
mented markets. The temporary demand pressure is present for an uncertain, arbitrarily long time span, but disappears
in finite time with probability one. Risk-neutral arbitrageurs can take positions in both local markets, and have to decide
how to allocate their limited capital across uncertain future arbitrage opportunities. This allocation – together with the
uncertain duration of the local demand pressure – determines the future distribution of the price gap between the two
assets. Hence, the individually optimal intertemporal allocation of capital and the distribution of future arbitrage oppor-
tunities are determined simultaneously in equilibrium.
I argued that competition among arbitrageurs with limited capital transforms the dynamic properties of arbitrage prices.
In particular, even if the fundamental process is riskless in the sense that the price gap could never widen, arbitrageurs’
activity introduces potential losses. Interestingly, the intuition behind this result is of the same type as the text-book argu-
ment of why unconstrained arbitrageurs eliminate price discrepancies. There, price discrepancies cannot exist, because
they are so attractive for arbitrageurs that they would eliminate them. I showed that when arbitrageurs are financially con-
strained, there cannot be any time period when there are no potential losses, because this would be a too attractive arbi-
trage opportunity. Arbitrageurs would increase their positions in these periods relative to other periods, which would cre-
ate potential losses.
Importantly, I highlighted that our mechanism is not based on amplification of an external shock. In the robust equilibri-
um, there are no exogenous reasons which would result in losses for arbitrageurs in any states of the world. Arbitrageurs
total losses are created endogenously. In a calibrated example, I showed that in this case, arbitrageurs lose most of their
capital with positive probability in a relatively short time.
The model illustrates that the presence of price gaps between fundamentally very similar assets does not necessarily
indicate the lack of arbitrage activity, even if these gaps are occasionally substantial. In the robust equilibrium, arbi-
trageurs with limited capital never fully eliminate price gaps. The main effect of their activity is different. They transform
the dynamics of the price gap so it will move in a much less predictable way. Thus the arbitrage opportunity becomes
much less profitable. Decreasing the predictability of price differentials is the way how positive expected profits are trad-
ed away by arbitrageurs.
The simplicity of our framework provides the potential of wide applicability to different problems related to limited arbi-
trage. In Kondor (2006), I demonstrate this potential by building an extension of career concerns on top of our structure.
As future work I consider the applicability of our model to a multi-asset set up to analyze contagion across markets and
the effects of flight-to-quality and flight-to-liquidity in times of market depression. I believe that our mechanism will shed
more light on these issues.
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A.1. MICROFOUNDATION OF LOCAL TRADERS’ BEHAVIOR
In this appendix I provide a possible microfoundation of local traders’ behavior which is consistent with Assumptions 1-
7. First I show that a standard OLG set-up with general utility functions is sufficient to satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2 and I
give the necessary restriction on the utility function which makes the structure consistent with Assumption 6. For
Assumptions 3-7, more structure is needed. Thus I present an example with CARA utilities which satisfy all assumptions.
The reader may observe that Assumption 7 is the most demanding. It is virtually equivalent with the requirement of the
negative exponential utility function in a representative agent framework. Although it might seem too restrictive, this
Assumption is not critical for the main results of the paper. It only simplifies the analysis enormously.
Let us suppose that each trader lives for a fixed interval of ∆
d
and a new generation of traders is born in each time
instant.
25
As the assets pay a dividend once in each ∆
d
interval, all traders receive dividend payments exactly once in
his lifetime. Each trader receives a lifetime endowment and makes a buy-and-hold investment decision when born, and
liquidates her investment and consumes the proceeds just before she dies. Her lifetime endowment, n
i
(t) consists of a
constant wage, n, and a non-tradable stochastic component which is correlated with the pay-off of the risky asset, R (t
d
).
In particular, the stochastic component pays w 
i
R (t
d 
) units at each t if the window is open. Hence, the value of her
endowment just before she dies will be 
and ωB = ω′ ≠ ωA = ω′′. The window closes when the stochastic component disappears, i.e., ωA = ωB = 0.
Each young trader born at time t on island i makes the investment decision of buying θ i(t) units of the risk asset when
born,. In time t + ∆t when old, she liquidates her investment and consume her total income: the value of her endowment
plus the proceeds of her investment decision. Each of them values her consumption according to a standard, strictly
increasing and concave utility function u (⋅). Hence, an i-trader, i = A,B, born at t in a window solves the problem 
(21)
where the notation is the same as in the main text. The first order condition of this problem implicitly determines the
inverse demand curves p
i
(t) = d 
i
(θ i(t), pi (t + ∆t), pc (t + ∆t)) as long as the window is open. Note that this demand curve
is a special case of (1), as it depends only on one future price    
Here, I endogenize the price when the window is closed, p
c
(t). I assume that windows can reopen but only after staying
closed at least for an interval of ∆
d 
. Hence, the window can change its state only once in each trader’s lifetime. The new
window will be one of two types. It will be either the same as the first one, or it can be a reverse window, where the roles
of the two group of traders are reversed, i.e., ωB = ω′′ ≠ ωA = ω′. Conditional on a closed window, a new window of each
type opens with probability in each time instant. This symmetric structure ensures that arbitrageurs do not have any
motivation to trade when the window is closed, which is consistent with the main text. Hence, when the window is closed,
traders born in period t solve a very similar problem to (21): 
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Appendix
25
Our OLG formulation is a simplifying assumption to keep our model tractable. It is not necessary for our story to go through. For example, infinitely lived
agents of Lucas (1978) would be consistent with the intuition. However, this would make the model much less tractable as in this case asset prices would
depend on both future and present consumption, hence they depend on past, present and future asset-holding. This would complicate the analysis with-
out providing virtually any added value.
where I exploited the symmetry in our structure, i.e., that in both islands in one of the possible windows the future price
will be p
A
(t + ∆
d 
) and in the other window it will be p
B
(t + ∆
d 
). The first order condition of this exercise gives the inverse
demand function p
c
(t) = d
c
(θ i(t), pA (t + ∆
d 
), p
B
(t + ∆
d 
), p
C
(t + ∆
d 
)).
(22)
With the help of the first order conditions of problems (21) and (22) the system (2)-(3) which determines autarchy prices
modifies to 
(23)
(24)
(25)
after straightforward manipulations. It is simple to show that these three equations determine unique and well defined
autarchy prices of p
A
*, p
B
* and p
c
values. As arbitrageurs do not trade when the windows are closed p
c
(t + ∆
d 
) = 
p
c
(t)  = p
c
which is consistent with the main text.
The above structure satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. However, since Fishburn and Porter (1976) we know that agents with
general utility functions might demand more of stochastically dominated gambles. Thus, Assumption 6 might not hold.
Hadar and Seo (1990) shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for Assumption 6 to hold in our set up is that the
relative risk aversion is less than or equal to 1 for every possible consumption level W (t).
A.1.1. Example: the CARA-symmetric framework
Let us suppose that the utility of traders with consumption W (t + ∆
d 
) when old is u (W (t + ∆
d 
)) = –e
(–aW (t+∆d))
, and R (t
d 
)
has a binomial distribution. In each period t
d 
, R (t
d 
) is either R > 0 or – R with equal probability and ωA = –ωB = –ω.
In this structure trader A choosing position θ (t) maximizes 
which is equivalent with maximizing 
This, and the analogous problem for trader B gives the inverse demand curves 
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(26)
Thus, the structure is symmetric in the sense of Assumption 7.
The autarchy prices are given by 
Because of p
A
(t) – p
c
= p
c
– p
B
(t) for any θ (t), θ– = θ– (pA
t+1
+ p
B
t+1
) the position which eliminates the gap between current
prices for given future prices, is given as the unique and positive solution of 
θ– is well defined and positive, because the left hand side is a positive and monotonically decreasing function in θ–  while
the right hand side is monotonically increasing in θ– and at θ– = 0, the right hand side is larger than the left hand side.
Hence, Assumption 3 is satisfied. As the domain of right hand side of (26) contains R
+
for both arguments, Assumption
4 is also satisfied.
I show now that Assumption 5 holds for demand curve (26). I have to demonstrate that if θ–+ is a solution of the equation  
(28)
for a given g
+
then g
+
> g* implies θ +< 0 and g + < 0 implies θ +> 0. Let us start with the first case. Observe that the right-
hand side is a monotonically increasing function of θ + while the right hand side is monotonically decreasing in θ + for all
g
+
. We know from the definition of g* that if g
+
= 0 then θ + = 0 Thus, if g + > g* then 
Consequently, if g
+
> 0  θ + must be negative to make the two sides of (28) equal. Similarly, g + = 0 and θ + = ω satisfies
(28). But if g
+
< 0 
Thus, if g
+
< 0, then θ + must be larger than ω to make the two sides of (28) equal.
The last step is to check whether the relative risk aversion is less then or equal to 1 in the relevant range of θ ∈ [0, θ–max]
and g
t+1
∈ [0,g*] . This implies that
has to hold for all R (t
d 
) and θ ∈ [0, θ–max] and g
t+1
∈ [0,g*] . As the supports of all variables on the right hand side are
bounded, there must be a small enough α which makes the inequality hold.
APPENDIX
MNB WORKING PAPERS · 2006/6 31
A.2. PROOFS
Proof The interior solutions of the dynamic system are characterized by the differential equations First, let us check
whether corner solutions are possible. In a corner solution, there is at a time T when the aggregate budget constraint
binds and arbitrageurs cannot take positions. However, if v
– 
(T) = 0, v
–
(T + τ) for all τ ≥ 0, because arbitrageurs cannot
realize gains without taking positions. Hence, if such a period existed, x
–
T+τ = 0 and gt+1 ∈ [T + τ] = 0 for τ ≥ 0 as in
autarchy. But observe, that the expected marginal profit in autarchy is infinity as investing one unit in T would give 
but g
⋅
= 0. Which is a contradiction as it would imply that arbitrageurs would not save capital for a period with infinite mar-
ginal profit. Thus we have only interior solutions.
By standard methods the general solution of the non-homogenous linear differential equation of (8) is 
where c
1
is a constant. Plugging in the general solution of (8) into (7) gives the homogenous linear differential equation 
with the general solution of 
(29)
where c
2
is a constant. Thus, lim
t→∞ g (t) = and g (0) = .
There is evidently an equilibrium, if g (t) = 0 for all t.This satisfies all the conditions with c
1
= c
2
= 0 and it also satisfies
the and the budget constraint for this case 
(30)
To find the other solutions, note that form the construction of the system, g (t) and g
⋅
(t) must have the same sign.
Otherwise the gap can move only in one direction and arbitrageurs have a safe profit opportunity. This would make them
to increase their positions without bounds so g (t) would reach 0 by Assumption 3. Thus, c
1 
> 0.
Let us suppose first that c
2 
< 0. In this case, g (t) would be always negative, monotonically increasing and would con-
verge to the negative level . Let us suppose that there exist a {x
– 
(t)}
∞
t=0
which supports this path. Because of the conti-
nuity of f (x
–
t 
,g (h)
h>t 
), there must be a large enough T that for any T + τ, the market clearing aggregate investment lev-
els {x
– 
(t)}
∞
t=T+τ implied by the market clearing condition 
would not change sing. As the limit of this series must be given by Assumption 5 implies that
x
–
(T+τ) is positive for all τ ≥ 0. In this case the potential loss in each period on each unit is  hence, the budget constraint
has the form of g (T+τ)
(31)
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But – as neither x
–
(t) nor g (t) converges to 0 – the left hand side is not convergent which is a contradiction. Analogous
arguments rule out the possibility of c
2
> c
1 
g* where the aggregate positions are negative by Assumption 5 at least after
a fixed time T.
Thus, the only possibility that = g
∞
∈ [0, g*]. In this case all g (t) are positive and g (t) is monotonically increasing. From
g (0) = g
0
and lim
t→∞ g (t) = g∞ we get , thus 
(32)
(33)
Observe, that if we compare local traders’ distribution of pay-offs in the autarchy case and when 0 < g (t) < g* is monot-
onically increasing, by Assumption 6, we have to conclude that x (t) ∈ (0, θ– max) for all t. Thus the largest loss in each peri-
od is g
⋅
(t). As the expected instantaneous profit is positive in each period, the budget constraint has to be strict: 
(34)
The last step is to find a g
0
as a function of ν–
0
for a given g
∞
to satisfy the budget constraint (34). The series {g (t)}
∞
t=0
will
give the series x
–
(t) by the market clearing condition. First note that for a given g
∞
if {g (t)}
∞
t=0
is the series with g (0) = g
0
and {g
+
(t)}
∞
t=0
is the series with a g (0) = g
+
0
where g
0
< g
+
0
then the two series differ only in their starting points, i.e., there
is a h that g
+
(t) = g (t+h) for all t.To see this, observe that as g (t) is continuous and monotonically increasing between
g
0
and g
∞
there must be a h that g (h) = g
+
0 
. But then 
This implies that 
thus ∫ ∞
0
x
–
(t) g
⋅
(t) is monotonically decreasing in g
0
for any fixed g
∞ 
. Consequently, if 
for any ν–
0
∈ (0, ν–
0
max,g
∞
) there exists a single g
0
that 
Proof of Theorem 3 Interior solutions of the dynamic system with m > 0 are given by 
(35) 
(36)
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The general solution is 
(37) 
(38)
It is clear that the budget constraint can only converge if lim
t→∞ x
–  
(t) = 0 so im
t→∞ x
–  
(t) = g*. As is
not convergent, there cannot be an interior solution for all t. Hence, by large enough T arbitrageurs will lose all their cap-
ital and we must have a corner solution of x
–  
(T+τ) = 0 and g (T+τ) = g* for τ ≥ 0. As this implies a stationary environment
and δ > 0, in this case arbitrageurs would choose to invest all their capital in time T if they had any. Thus, 
and . From g (T) = g*.
Consequently, for all 0 ≥ t > T
Observe that 
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, we know that there is {x
– 
(t)}
∞
t=0
∈ (0, θ– max) which satisfy the market clearing condition
g (t) = f (x
– 
(t), g (h)
h>t 
) for all t. The last step is to find T. By definition of T, we know that 
(39)
must hold. Since g (t) depends on time only through T – t the left hand side of (39) is monotonically increasing in T. As 
and 
for any ν–
0
> 0, there must be a unique T which satisfies (39).
Proof Theorem 4 As I showed in the proof of Theorem 1, the robust equilibrium is given by the general solution of differ-
ential equations (7)-(8), (29) and two boundary conditions. The first one is lim
t→∞ g (t) = g* which gives c2 = g*c1. The
second one is the budget constraint (34). In the proof, I defined g
0
in terms of c
1
and used (34) to pinned down g
0 
. An
equivalent step is to pin down c
1
by (34). Observe also that the unique equilibrium when m > 0 can be given by the fol-
lowing steps. We know that for all t ≤ T the general solution is 
(40)
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where I added subscript m to the constants c
m
1
and c
m
2
to distinguish from the corresponding constants in the robust equi-
librium. Instead of expressing c
m
1
from the boundary condition 
we can equivalently express T as 
Substituting T into (40), the boundary condition g (T) = g* gives 
(41)
Finally, c
m
1
is pinned down by the modified budget constraint after substituting (41) into (40): 
(42)
Observe that as m → 0, the general solution (38) converges to (29), lim
m→∞ c
m
2
= c
m
1
g*, lim
m→0 T = ∞, thus the left hand
side of (42) converges to the left hand side of (34). Consequently, lim
m→0  c
m
1
= c
1
and the equilibrium with m >0 must
converge to the robust equilibrium.
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